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THE IMPACT OF FIRING RESTRICTIONS ON LABOUR
MARKET EQUILIBRIUM IN THE PRESENCE OF ON-THE-JOB
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Job-to-job turnover provides a way for employers to escape statutory firing costs, as unprofitable
workers may willfully quit their job on receiving an outside offer, or may be induced to accept one
that they would otherwise reject with a negotiated severance package. We formalise those
mechanisms within an extension of the Diamond–Mortensen–Pissarides model that allows for
employed job search. We find that our model explains why higher firing costs intensify job-to-job
turnover at the expense of transitions out of unemployment and that ignoring on-the-job search
leads one to overstate the adverse impact of firing costs on employment.
Job-to-job turnover provides a way for employers to escape firing costs. While the
primary effect of firing costs is to induce firms to keep employees in unprofitable
matches, such unprofitable employees may willfully quit their job on receiving an
outside offer, thus sparing their incumbent employer the firing costs. Furthermore,
employers can induce their unprofitable workers to accept outside job offers that they
would otherwise reject by offering voluntary severance packages, which are less costly
than the full statutory dismissal cost. We formalise those mechanisms within an
extension of the Diamond–Mortensen–Pissarides (DMP) matching model (Mortensen
and Pissarides, 1994) that allows for employed job search and negotiation over
severance packages.
The impact of firing costs on labour market equilibrium has been an object of
keen study in the search and matching literature (see the review in Mortensen and
Pissarides, 1999, or more recently Ljungqvist, 2002). Firing costs are typically found
to discourage both job destruction and job creation, thereby substantially reducing
both unemployment outflows and inflows with a resulting effect on the equilibrium
unemployment rate which is ambiguously signed and quantitatively negligible.1 While
several empirical contributions find a small or insignificant impact of the strictness of
employment protection legislation on the unemployment rate in various contexts,
the empirical literature is, overall, somewhat inconclusive and emphasises the
sensitivity of the estimated impact of firing costs on unemployment to the data and
specification used (Nickell, 1997; OECD, 1999; Blanchard and Portugal, 2000; Kahn,
2010).
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1 Of course this somewhat sweeping summary does not do justice to the vast literature on that subject and
exceptions to those findings do exist. A relevant example for our purposes is Cahuc and Zylberberg (1999)
who point out that the degree of wage rigidity (specifically, the level of the minimum wage) is a key
determinant of the impact of firing costs on labour market equilibrium in the DMP model.
Yet that large body of research consistently ignores direct job-to-job flows. Job-to-job
flows are quantitatively substantial, amounting to between a third and a half of total
labour reallocation and relevant to the issue of firing costs as a worker who quits a job
spontaneously is usually not entitled to any redundancy payment and does not make
the firm liable to a firing tax. We thus propose to introduce employed job search in a
DMP-type model with firing costs and a minimum wage (the role of which we will
discuss shortly). We show that the presence of employed job search strongly affects the
response of unemployment flow rates and the unemployment rate to increases in firing
costs when the minimum wage is not too low. Specifically, we find that higher firing
costs discourage job destruction to a much larger extent than they do in the DMP
model without employed job search and, conversely, that employed job search largely
cushions the adverse impact of firing costs on job creation. As a result, firing costs have
a quantitatively sizeable negative impact on the unemployment rate in that model. The
difference in the economy’s behaviour brought about by on-the-job search is due to the
fact that, as mentioned earlier, job-to-job turnover enables employers to avoid paying
the statutory firing cost in some cases.
Aside from on-the-job search, our model has three important specific features. First,
as an alternative to the conventional practice of applying the Nash solution, we assume
that mutual consent is the basic principle governing wage (re)negotiation in
continuing firm–worker matches. Specifically, under that assumption, the wage is
only altered when one of the worker’s or the firm’s outside options becomes binding,
in which case the wage is revised up or down by just enough to satisfy whichever
constraint is binding. It is an attractive assumption because it features in many labour
contracts (Malcomson, 1997, for empirical evidence), it delivers realistic wage
dynamics (Postel-Vinay and Turon, 2010), and it can be justified theoretically in
different contexts (see the discussion in footnote 4 below and in Appendix A).
Second, as we show in the article, that assumption lends itself well to the analysis of
endogenous severance packages, which arise naturally in the formal bargaining game
that we use to deliver the wage determination rules just described. While not essential
to the argument or main results of this article, severance packages are appealing for
three reasons. First, this practice is observed to be used by employers aiming to reduce
their workforce.2 Second, it is difficult to rule them out theoretically in the context of a
bargaining model like ours, other than by assuming that firms can somehow commit
not to offer a severance package when it is in their interest to do so. Finally, and
perhaps most importantly, allowing for severance packages actually simplifies the
analysis: allowing for negotiated transfers at the point of separation forces firm–worker
matches to fully internalise the future effects of current wage increases, which has the
2 Examples include the ‘Mutually Agreed Resignation Scheme’ put in place by employers affiliate with the
UK National Health Service (NHS), whereby ‘individual employees – in agreement with their employer –
choose to leave their employment voluntarily, in return for payment’ (http://www.nhsemployers.org/, July
2012). Other anecdotal evidence is the news item that Sunderland City Council (UK) is offering its staff up to
a year’s pay to quit (Sunderland Echo, July 2012). Other countries also use ‘encouraged quits’ as an alternative
to simple layoffs. Hofer et al. (2011) analyse the impact of the 2003 reform of the Austrian severance pay
legislation designed to encourage worker mobility from shrinking firms by allowing workers to keep their
entitlement to severance pay if they quit. Morin and Vicens (2001) review redundancy practices in Europe
and report a widespread practice in France and Germany of helping dismissed workers to find alternative
employment by way of training schemes and compensation.
consequence that the joint value (to the firm–worker pair) of any match is
independent of the way that this value is split (i.e. is independent of the wage). We
discuss this important property in the main text.
The third distinguishing feature of our model is, as already mentioned, the presence
of a minimum wage. We introduce a minimum wage for two reasons. First, studying
the combined impact of firing costs and the minimum wage – two of the most
common ingredients of labour market regulation in OECD economies – is an
interesting exercise in its own right (Cahuc and Zylberberg, 1999; Boeri and Burda,
2009; Silva, 2010). Second, although so far we have put the emphasis on employers
offering their workers severance packages to induce them to quit into alternative jobs,
in certain circumstances severance packages may also be used by employers as a means
of inducing their workers to quit into unemployment (as opposed to firing them and
incurring the firing cost). As first shown by Fella (2007) and confirmed in this article,
if employers are allowed to offer severance packages to induce quits into unemploy-
ment, then some form of wage rigidity is required for firing costs to have any impact at
all on job flows and unemployment. Intuitively, Fella (2007) shows that, if the firing
cost is paid by the firm to a third party (tax, red-tape cost ...), it is always in the joint
interest of the firm–worker match to avoid paying that tax by agreeing on a voluntary
separation in which, rather than paying the firing cost (which would then be lost for
the match), the firm offers the worker a voluntary severance package equal to the
worker’s foregone surplus from employment. In doing so, the firm effectively turns the
firing tax into a transfer to the worker: the distinction between redundancy tax and
transfer is rendered ineffectual by severance packages. As is well known (at least since
Lazear, 1990), in the absence of wage rigidity, firing restrictions in the form of firm–
worker transfers can be completely offset by contracts between risk-neutral employers
and employees. Fella’s (2007) contribution is to show that firing taxes can also be
offset as long as risk-neutral employers and employees are able to negotiate side-
payments (severance packages) to induce workers to quit into unemployment without
incurring the firing tax. This result no longer holds, however, in the presence of a
source of wage rigidity such as an institutional wage floor. We will see that in our
model, as in Fella’s, the economy finds itself in two very different regimes regarding
the effectiveness of firing costs depending on whether the minimum wage is binding
at the point of job destruction.
The rest of this article is organised as follows. Our model is described in Section 1
and its solution with exogenous contact rates is discussed in Section 2. The
characterisation of the full model solution, i.e. with endogenous contact rates is
presented in Section 3. A calibration and simulation illustration is carried out in




We take up all basic assumptions about the workings of the product and labour
markets from Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), from which we only depart by allowing
employed workers to search on-the-job. The labour market thus features a unit mass of
workers facing a continuum of identical firms producing a unique multi-purpose good
sold in a perfectly competitive product market. Workers and firms are infinitely lived,
forward-looking, risk-neutral and have a common exogenous discount rate of q. Time
is continuous and the economy is in steady state.
Workers can either be unemployed or matched with a firm. Firms and workers
are matched through a time-consuming search process, modelled in the following
conventional way: unemployed (employed) workers receive job offers at a Poisson
rate k0 (k1). We thus assume that all workers search for a (better) job and that their
search intensity, although exogenous, depends on their employment status. We
should note from the outset that not all offers are conducive to an actual match:
workers will only accept an offer whenever it yields greater value than what they
enjoy in their current state (more details on this below). Finally, note that we are
treating the offer arrival rates k0 and k1 as exogenous parameters for the time
being. We shall endogenise them later in the analysis by means of a matching
function.
Firms operate a constant-return technology and are modelled as a collection of
job slots which can either be vacant or occupied and producing. The quality of
worker-firm matches is heterogeneous and subject to shocks. We define the output
flow of a match as z, which represents a match-specific productivity, comprised in [0,
1] and subject to shocks (we omit the usual aggregate productivity index without loss
of generality). The (Poisson) arrival rate of shocks to match productivity is denoted
d and the post-shock value of z (z 0, say) is drawn from a continuous distribution F()
over [0,1] (a normalisation), independently of the pre-shock value of z.3 Shocks are
also uncorrelated across matches. Finally, following standard practice, we assume
that all new matches start out with the highest level of productivity, z ¼ 1 (more on
this below). Then, like the conventional DMP model, our model features
endogenous job destruction: upon drawing a productivity shock below a certain
threshold (to be formally defined below), the firm will want to end the employment
relationship.
1.1.2. Institutions
One of the objectives of this article is to analyse the combined impact of firing costs
and the minimum wage on labour market equilibrium. We thus assume that firms are
required to pay all their employees a wage greater than the institutional wage floor
wmin and are liable to a firing cost of T payable upon laying off a worker. It is important
to stress that statutory dismissal costs are only applicable to employer-initiated
separations to which the worker does not consent.
T and wmin are exogenous policy parameters. In line with much of the literature, it
may be easiest in the rest of this article to think of T as either a firing tax or as red tape
costs, i.e. as a third-party payment which is a net loss to the firm–worker match rather
than a statutory transfer paid by the firm to the worker upon separation. However,
3 This latter assumption is common in this literature, though not necessarily desirable as implying
identical destruction hazards for all jobs. We still maintain it, in the interest of tractability.
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given our wage determination rule, that distinction has no bearing on the impact of T
on equilibrium job flows and unemployment (it only affects the distribution of
payoffs). Formal details are given in Appendix A.
1.2. The Employment Relationship
1.2.1. Notation and working assumptions
Considering a firm–worker match with a current idiosyncratic productivity level of z,
we denote the wage flow paid in this match by w and define J(z,w) (E(z,w)) as the
value of this match to the firm (to the worker). We also introduce the total (gross)
match value: V(z) ¼ J(z,w) + E(z,w). We justify below that this value is independent
of the wage paid. Finally, we denote the worker’s lifetime value of unemployment as
U and assume that the firm’s valuation of a vacant job is zero, as results from free
entry on the search market (see below).
We start working under the following set of hypotheses about the impact of
wages and productivity on the various value functions: @J/@z > 0, @J/@w < 0,
@E/@w > 0, V 0ðzÞ [ 0. All of those hypotheses will be formally confirmed later in
the analysis.
We also assume that there are gains to trade on the labour market. More precisely,
workers and employers are both willing to consummate a match with the maximum
productivity level z ¼ 1 and a minimum wage of wmin, i.e. formally Eð1;wminÞ  U and
J ð1;wminÞ  0.
We now introduce an additional series of definitions for future use. We first
define R0ðwÞ, the value of productivity at which, given a wage of w, the firm’s
valuation of the match is zero, by J ½R0ðwÞ;w ¼ 0. Note that, because of layoff costs,
this is not the productivity at which the firm decides to terminate the employment
relationship. We further denote by w0ðzÞ the inverse of R0ðÞ, i.e. the maximum
wage that a firm can pay without incurring a loss (in expected present value terms)
given a current productivity level of z. We can then mutatis mutandis define the
threshold productivity RT ðwÞ as the solution to J ½RT ðwÞ;w ¼ T and the inverse
wT ðzÞ of the function RT ðÞ. RT ðÞ gives the cutoff productivity value below which
the firm is better off firing the worker (thus incurring the layoff cost T) than
retaining her/him at the wage w. Our assumptions about the monotonicity of
J() with respect to both of its arguments ensure the consistency of all these
definitions.
1.2.2. Wage determination
Our wage determination mechanism builds on Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002a, b) and
Postel-Vinay and Turon (2010). Wages are set by firms. Workers, however, can use
market pressure to extract some rent. Indeed they will use outside job offers to obtain
wage increases by playing off potential employers against one another, as detailed in
the following paragraphs. The principle governing all wage renegotiations is that of
mutual consent. That is, either party can only force wage renegotiation to their
advantage if the value of their outside option exceeds their current value in the match,
giving them a credible threat to leave the match. When renegotiation does take place,
the wage is adjusted up or down so as to give the forcing party the exact value of their
outside option.4 In the presence of firing costs, the value of the firm’s outside option is
the value of a vacant job, i.e. zero, less the firing cost T. Since quits are not legally liable
for statutory dismissal costs, the worker’s outside option is either the value of
unemployment or the value of his/her outside job offer, if any.
1.2.3. Severance packages
The most immediate effect of employment protection is to induce firms to keep
employees even when a negative productivity shock leads them to incur losses (up to
the level of the firing cost) in the current match. Under the mutual consent rule, as
long as these losses are less than the amount the firm would have to pay to fire the
worker, the firm has no credible threat to dissolve the match and cannot force the
worker to renegotiate the wage downwards.
Thus an obvious, however little explored consequence of the enforcement of
statutory redundancy pay is that it leads firms and workers to negotiate severance
packages aimed at encouraging the worker to leave when the firm is currently
incurring losses. For example, in the event of an outside offer arising, the incumbent
employer is willing to compensate the worker for him/her to accept it, up to the level
of the current losses. Assuming that both worker and firm can observe the value of the
outside offer, the incumbent firm will offer a severance package to the worker yielding
him/her a value of quitting with this offer and this severance package marginally
greater than the value of staying with his/her incumbent employer.
Depending on parameter values, severance packages can just as well arise at the
firing margin (Fella, 2007). We shall see below that, for given values of the minimum
wage and unemployment income, as the firing cost T is increased, it may become both
feasible and beneficial for employers to induce workers to quit into unemployment
upon being hit by a sufficiently adverse productivity shock. Depending on whether this
is the case or not, the impact of job security provisions on the equilibrium layoff rate
will be very different.
1.3. Outside Offers
Given a current wage of w and a current productivity level of z, we denote the
continuation values of the match to the firm (the worker) after an outside offer as
Joðz;wÞ ( Eoðz;wÞ).
When an employed worker is contacted by an outside firm, we assume the
sequence of events to be the following. The outside firm gets one chance to make the
worker an offer, in the knowledge of current match productivity in the incumbent
firm. A bargaining game is then played between the worker and the incumbent
employer, in which the latter has an opportunity to raise the worker’s wage, to offer a
severance package or to do nothing, letting the worker either stay in the match with
4 Different theoretical foundations exist for this rule (MacLeod and Malcomson, 1993). Models of self-
enforcingwage contractswithin amatch facedwithuncertainty aboutproductivity and/ormarket opportunities
deliver a similar wage rule (Thomas andWorrall, 1988).Hall (2005) also considers this wage settingmechanism
whichhe interprets as a social norm favouringwage rigidity. In this particular article, we justify that rule using an
explicit finite-horizon bargaining game spelled out in Appendix A. While we do not mean to tout our own
theoretical foundation as being superior to any other, our game has the merit of simplicity.
the existing wage, or quit to the poaching firm. Details of a specific strategic game are
given in Appendix A and we only give an intuitive description of the bargain in the
main text.
Denote the value to the worker of the outside offer by E 0. Because all new matches
start out with the maximum productivity level z ¼ 1,5 the maximum worker’s value of
the outside offer is V(1), which is also the maximum value of employment as the
worker is never able to claim a wage yielding a higher value than this, having no outside
offer enabling him/her to do so. The minimum value of the outside offer is in turn
constrained by the existence of a minimum wage to be Eð1;wminÞ. For future use, we
denote by zm the value of the match productivity such that Eð1;wminÞ ¼ V ðzmÞ. So the
boundaries of the worker’s value of the outside offer are summarised as:
V ðzmÞ  E 0  V ð1Þ.
If the value of the outside offer is less than the worker’s value of the current match,
i.e. E 0\Eðz;wÞ, the worker will opt to stay with the current firm. If, however, the
incumbent firm is incurring losses in this match, it will be in its best interest to offer a
severance package to the worker to induce him/her to take up the outside offer. The
minimum value required by the worker to do so is Eðz;wÞ  E 0. The firm will find it
profitable to offer this amount if it is lower than the current (negative) firm’s value of
the match. Note that the firm always has the option of firing the worker and pay the
layoff premium of T, which therefore is an upper bound on the value of the severance
package that the firm is willing to offer.
We first consider the case where the firm currently makes a profit, i.e. where
z  R0ðwÞ , w  w0ðzÞ. Three situations may arise, depending on the value of z. First,
if z ¼ 1, then the incumbent and the poaching firm are equally productive. The
worker’s value is then bid up to V(1), i.e. the worker extracts the whole surplus from
either match. The worker then becomes indifferent between staying with her/his
initial employer or taking up the poacher’s offer and we assume s/he opts for the
former (an innocuous assumption in our context). The continuation value of the
initial match will hence be split into Eo ½1;w0ð1Þ ¼ V ð1Þ to the worker and
J o ½1;w0ð1Þ ¼ 0 to the incumbent employer. Second, if 1 [ z  zm , the worker will
leave the incumbent firm as the poacher now values the worker’s employment more
than the incumbent. When attempting to retain the worker, the incumbent firm will
bid the wage up to a level yielding the worker a value of V(z), which is the maximum
offer that the incumbent firm is willing to make. The outside firm (profitably) offers
this value in order to bid the worker away from the incumbent. Hence in this case
Eoðz;wÞ ¼ V ðzÞ and Joðz;wÞ ¼ 0. Finally, if z\ zm , that maximum offer is less than the
minimum offer that the poacher is allowed to make (because of minimum wage
regulations), yielding the worker a value of Eð1;wminÞ ¼ V ðzmÞ. The worker then quits
5 This assumption implies that all outside offers lead to a job-to-job movement. It was pointed out to us
that this may exaggerate the benefits of severance pay. In the online Appendix to this article we examine a
modified version of the model where new matches have an initial productivity drawn from some continuous
distribution over [0,1]. We carry out simulations under various assumptions about that distribution of initial
productivity and find that, while there are quantitative differences between the various cases illustrated, we
observe the same qualitative behaviour of the model: the presence of on-the-job search has a marked impact
on the response of unemployment level and flow rates to an increase in firing costs.
with a value of Eoðz;wÞ ¼ Eð1;wminÞ and the incumbent firm is left with a value of
Joðz;wÞ ¼ 0.
Let us now look at the case where the incumbent firm is currently incurring losses at
the prevailing wage, i.e. J ðz;wÞ\ 0, Eðz;wÞ [ V ðzÞ , z\R0ðwÞ , w [ w0ðzÞ. As
the worker is never able to raise his/her wage above w0ð1Þ, the firm cannot be making
losses when the match productivity equals 1. If 1 [ z  zm , the poacher will make a
maximum offer yielding the worker a value of V(z), which is less than the current
worker’s value of the incumbent match, E(z,w), since the firm is making losses. So, as it
stands, the worker would opt to stay with the incumbent firm. However, as this latter is
incurring losses, it is in its interest to induce the worker to leave and it will do so by
offering a severance package exactly compensating the worker for the difference
between the offer and his/her current value of employment: E(z, w)  V(z) ¼  J(z, w).
As a result, the worker quits her/his job with a continuation value of Eoðz;wÞ ¼ Eðz;wÞ,
leaving her/his initial employer with a value of Joðz;wÞ ¼ J ðz;wÞ\ 0. If z\ zm , the
poacher’s offer cannot be worth less than V ðzmÞ to the worker because of the binding
minimum wage. If that is greater than the value the worker gets from the current match,
s/he will leave spontaneously. If it is lower, the incumbent firm will offer a severance
package of Eðz;wÞ  V ðzmÞ to inducehim/her to leave. Theworker thus leaves the initial
match with a continuation value of Eoðz;wÞ ¼ max½Eðz;wÞ;V ðzmÞ, while the incumbent
employer receives a continuation value of Joðz;wÞ ¼ max½Eðz;wÞ  V ðzmÞ; 0. Note
that this is greater than J(z,w), so that the worker’s receipt of an outside offer is a
positive shock for the firm in this instance.
Table 1 summarises the continuation values ð Eo ; Jo ; VoÞ for the worker, the incumbent
firm and the match after an outside offer in all cases examined above.
Before we move on, a discussion of the simplifications brought about by severance
packages is in order. As is clear from Table 1, the continuation value of a match after
an outside offer is independent of the wage prevailing before the occurrence of that
offer. This is a direct consequence of the possibility of side payments at the point of
separation. If we somehow ruled them out (e.g. by assuming that firms can commit
ex ante never to offer a severance package in response to an outside job offer), then any
poacher wanting to hire a worker whose incumbent employer is making a loss would
Table 1
Continuation Values After an Outside Offer
Incumbent employer:
Incurs losses: z  R0ðwÞ Makes a profit: z [ R0ðwÞ





Eo max½V ðzmÞ;Eðz;wÞ V ðzmÞ
Jo  max½Eðz;wÞ  V ðzmÞ; 0 0
Vo V ðzmÞ V ðzmÞ
have to offer the worker her/his full value E(z,w), as opposed to only V(z) (which is less
than E(z,w) as the incumbent firm is making a loss). Therefore, the continuation value
of the incumbent match following that outside offer would be E(z,w), a function of the
wage. In words, ruling out severance packages would allow firm–worker matches to
‘piggy-back’ on future potential poachers, who, in expectation, would have to deliver
part of the value E(z,w) owed to the worker in the initial match. By contrast, the
possibility of negotiated severance packages at the point of separation forces firm–
worker matches to fully internalise the future effects of current wage raises. This, in
turn, ensures that the value of a match is independent of the wage in that match, which
simplifies the analysis greatly, as it implies that all that matters for the equilibrium
allocation in this economy is the distribution of productivity across matches, not the
joint distribution of productivity and wages.
1.4. Productivity Shocks and Wage Cuts
Like outside job offers, productivity shocks can prompt wage renegotiation. The rules
for wage renegotiation after a productivity shock are the same as those following an
outside job offer, i.e. they are based on mutual consent and the same bargaining game
is played by the worker and the firm. Again, details of the game are confined to
Appendix A and we only describe the bargain outcome in the main text.
Because of the mutual consent rule, productivity shocks can only lead to downward
wage revisions (or layoffs). Indeed a positive productivity shock does not affect the
worker’s outside option and therefore does not give her/him an opportunity to force
her/his employer to accept a wage increase.6 Now, not all productivity shocks will cause
a wage cut: again, because of the mutual consent restriction, the productivity shock has
to be bad enough that the firm is better off firing the worker (firing cost
notwithstanding) than keeping her/him in employment at the current wage rate.
This happens whenever the firm would incur losses greater than T under the current
wage w and the new productivity draw z 0 (say), i.e. formally whenever z 0\RT ðwÞ.
When this is the case, the wage is revised down to the point where the firm’s outside
option (to fire the worker) is met, i.e. to the point where the firm’s valuation of the
match given the new productivity value z 0 equals T, the value of firing the worker.
Formally, the renegotiated wage is set to wT ðz 0Þ.
Of course, it may happen that the minimum wage makes this legally impossible.
For instance it may happen that the firm incurs losses greater than T, even when paying
the minimum wage wmin. In this case (which formally translates as z 0\RT ðwminÞ),
the match is dissolved. Yet, the situation regarding match dissolution is further
complicated by the possibility of negotiating severance packages. We now analyse the
job destruction rule in detail.
6 We are taking a bit of a shortcut here. This statement is only true to the extent that the worker is never
tempted to quit into unemployment. Given the minimum wage wmin, this formally translates into assuming
that Eðz;wminÞ  U for all ‘viable’ values of z, i.e. values of z such that the match is not dissolved (more on this
below). Were this not the case, firms would sometimes have to raise their worker’s wage following an adverse
productivity shock in order to keep them from quitting into unemployment. While this latter situation is
undeniably a theoretical possibility, covered in the renegotiation game analysed in Appendix A, we regard it
as factually implausible and rule it out in the main body of the article.
1.5. Job Destruction
1.5.1. Two regimes
As argued above, if productivity falls short of RT ðwminÞ, then the firm is better off firing
the worker and paying T than maintaining the match. As a result, any job drawing a
productivity level below RT ðwminÞ will inevitably be destroyed. Whether or not jobs are
maintained at all productivity levels above RT ðwminÞ depends on the worker’s valuation
of those jobs as we now explain.
First, if E ½RT ðwminÞ;wmin [ U þ T , then the worker strictly prefers employment at
the minimum wage and any productivity level above RT ðwminÞ to being laid off with the
maximum severance payment of T. In this case the firm can never profitably (i.e. at a
cost less than T ) induce the worker to quit into unemployment if z 0  RT ðwminÞ and
will find it optimal to fire the worker as soon as z 0\RT ðwminÞ. In this situation, some
separations are privately inefficient as the match surplus is strictly positive at RT ðwminÞ.7
If conversely E ½RT ðwminÞ;wmin  U þ T , then there is scope for the firm and the
worker to negotiate a severance package smaller than T that will induce the worker to
quit into unemployment. Indeed consider a match where the going wage is wð  wminÞ
and a productivity draw of z 0½  RT ðwminÞ such that U \Eðz 0;wÞ  U þ T and
J ðz 0;wÞ\ 0. The firm thus incurs losses and would like the worker to leave but the
worker is not going to do so spontaneously because Eðz 0;wÞ [ U . The compensation it
would take to induce the worker to leave is Eðz 0;wÞ  U  T and the employer’s value
of inducing a quit is therefore  Eðz 0;wÞ þ U ¼ J ðz 0;wÞ  ½V ðz 0Þ  U . Assuming
that the firm and the worker can sign an agreement whereby the worker agrees to leave
the firm voluntarily with a severance package of Eðz 0;wÞ  U , it will be in the parties’
joint interest to do so as soon as the productivity shock falls in a range such that
V ðz 0Þ\U , i.e. falls short of the threshold RS defined by V ðRSÞ ¼ U , such that the
match surplus is zero. All separations are privately efficient in this case.8
1.5.2. Summary of the job destruction rule
We use the generic notation D to designate the job destruction threshold, i.e. the level
of idiosyncratic productivity below which matches break up. The above developments
make it clear that the labour market will be in one of two regimes, with either
D ¼ RT ðwminÞ or D ¼ RS . In the former regime, separations may be privately
inefficient and directly governed by a binding minimum wage and mandatory
severance pay. In the latter regime, all separations are privately efficient given T and
wmin and the impact of these two policy instruments on the job destruction rate is only
indirect (see below). For want of a better denomination, we shall refer to the case
D ¼ RT ðwminÞ as the ‘inefficient separation regime’ and to the case D ¼ RS as the
‘efficient separation regime’.
Considerations in the previous paragraph imply that the job destruction threshold
D can be generically defined over both regimes as D ¼ max½RT ðwminÞ;RS . Section 2
7 It equals V ½RT ðwminÞ  U ¼ E ½RT ðwminÞ;wmin  U þ J ½RT ðwminÞ;wmin ¼ E ½RT ðwminÞ;wmin  U 
T [ 0.
8 Relating to footnote 6 above, we implicitly assume throughout the analysis that the minimum wage is
high enough that the worker is never willing to quit into unemployment without severance compensation. At
this point this formally amounts to assuming that EðRS ;wminÞ [ U .
below establishes formal definitions of RT ðwminÞ and RS , analyses the conditions under
which either regime prevails and studies the impact of T and wmin under both
regimes.
1.6. Continuation Values After a Productivity Shock
Given an initial wage of w, we denote the expected values of the match to the firm
(the worker, the match) after a shock to productivity as JsðwÞ( EsðwÞ, Vs). The generic
analytical expressions of those continuation values are somewhat cumbersome (due to
the fact that one has to consider different regimes depending on the relative ranking
of various productivity thresholds). Fortunately, we do not need to spell them out as
the ensuing analysis will only make use of a few relatively simple special cases. At this
point, we only bring up the obvious (yet important) remark that these continuation
values do not depend on any particular value of z (which immediately follows from the
assumption of independent sequential productivity draws).
1.7. Bellman Equations
We end our layout of the model by formally writing down the Bellman equations solved
by the various value functions defined and used above.
ðqþ dþ k1ÞJ ðz;wÞ ¼ z  w þ dJsðwÞ þ k1 Joðz;wÞ; ð1Þ
ðqþ dþ k1ÞEðz;wÞ ¼ w þ d EsðwÞ þ k1 Eoðz;wÞ; ð2Þ
ðqþ dþ k1ÞV ðzÞ ¼ z þ d Vs þ k1 VoðzÞ; ð3Þ
ðqþ k0ÞU ¼ b þ k0V ðzmÞ: ð4Þ
These definitions will be used for derivations below. A series of properties of these
functions is established in Appendix B.
2. Model Solution: The Case of Exogenous Contact Rates
In order to gain some insight about the equilibrium impact of the minimum wage and
firing costs on labour market performance, we begin by treating the firm–worker
contact rates, k0 and k1, as exogenous parameters. Again, those will be endogenised
later on. The purpose of this first step in the analysis is to focus on the partial impact of
T and wmin on the job separation margin.
2.1. The Job Destruction Thresholds
2.1.1. The inefficient separation regime: D ¼ RT ðwminÞ
By definition of the inefficient separation regime, the job destruction condition is
given by D ¼ RT ðwminÞ , J ðD;wminÞ ¼ T . Substituting this definition into
the Bellman equation (1) defining the firm’s valuation of a job, J(), is shown in





F ðxÞdx ¼ wmin  T ðqþ k1Þ; ð5Þ
where, in standard fashion, a bar over a cumulative density function (CDF) denotes the
corresponding survivor function.
2.1.2. The efficient separation regime: D ¼ RS
In the efficient separation regime, the firm and the worker agree to separate when the
joint value of the match reaches the value of unemployment:
V ðRSÞ ¼ U : ð6Þ
The formal definition of RS is somewhat more involved than that of D in the inefficient
separation regime and we therefore leave it in Appendix C, (C.6)–(C.10). Inspection of
those three equations, from which the parameter T is absent, readily confirms the
following result by Fella (2007) in our environment – which differs from his by the
presence of on-the-job search and wage renegotiation by mutual consent:
PROPOSITION 1. In the efficient separation regime, at given firm–worker contact rates k0 and
k1, firing costs have no impact on the job destruction threshold, RS .
This result is formally established in Appendix C. The underlying intuition is spelt out
in Fella (2007). If the firing cost is a tax, paid by the firm to a third party, actually
paying that tax is in the interest of none of the parties in a joint-surplus-maximising
firm–worker match. Now institutions provide firm–worker matches with a way of
dodging that tax: because the firing tax only applies to layoffs and not to quits, if the
firm’s value of the match becomes negative, it will induce a quit by offering the worker
a voluntary severance package (equal to the worker’s foregone surplus from
employment) rather than fire the worker and incur the firing tax. In doing so, the
firm effectively turns the firing tax into a transfer to the worker. In the efficient
separation regime, the minimum wage is low enough to allow for that transfer to be
fully priced out by adjusting the wage over the lifetime of the match. Things are
different in the inefficient separation regime, where the minimum wage prevents the
firm and the worker from fully pricing out severance packages. In that case, the firing
cost, even though it is still turned into a transfer to the worker, has bite.
2.2. Conditions Under Which Either Regime Prevails
Given fixed contact rates k0 and k1, which one of the inefficient or efficient separation
regime prevails depends on the implemented mix of employment protection,
minimum wage and unemployment compensation following a general pattern that
we summarise in the ensuing two Propositions.9
PROPOSITION 2. For a given value of the minimum wage wmin and the unemployment income
b, there exists a cutoff value T cðwmin; bÞ  0 of the statutory redundancy pay (possibly equal to
9 Proofs of both Propositions can be found in Appendix D.
zero) such that the inefficient separation regime prevails for all T  T cðwmin; bÞ while the
efficient separation regime prevails for all T [ T cðwmin; bÞ.
Given the minimum wage and unemployment benefits, the inefficient separation
regime tends to prevail under low values of the firing cost. As the firing cost is
increased, it becomes increasingly worthwhile for firms to negotiate whatever side
payment compensates the worker for quitting into unemployment as match produc-
tivity hits low levels in order to avoid paying the full firing cost.
Similar results hold for the other two policy tools, wmin and b:
PROPOSITION 3. Fix the statutory redundancy pay at T. Then, for a given value of the
unemployment income b (the minimum wage wmin), there exists a cutoff value wcminðT ; bÞ of the
minimum wage (a cutoff value of the unemployment income bcðT ;wminÞ) such that the efficient
separation regime prevails for all wmin  wcminðT ; bÞ (all b  bcðT ;wminÞ), while the inefficient
separation regime prevails for all wmin [ wcminðT Þ (all b\ bcðT ;wminÞ).
Again intuitively, given the level of firing costs, the inefficient separation regime tends
to prevail under high values of the minimum wage and low values of the
unemployment income. As either the minimum wage is reduced or the unemployment
benefit level is increased, the gap between the worker’s valuations of employment at
the minimum wage vis-a-vis unemployment narrows and eventually falls short of the
firing cost T, at which point the negotiation of severance packages lower than T at the
job destruction margin becomes feasible.
2.3. Comparative Statics
We confine our analysis of comparative statics to the inefficient separation regime as
firing costs do not affect outcomes in the efficient separation regime. The job
destruction condition (5) establishes an equilibrium relationship between D and k1,
which is parameterised by the policy tools ðT ;wminÞ. It is straightforward to show by
differentiation that, given k1, firms will adopt a lower D in the face of higher firing costs
and a higher D if the minimum wage is raised. Not surprisingly, our model thus
confirms the standard qualitative predictions about the response of job destruction
behaviour to these specific policy changes.
What is more interesting within the context of our model is to look at the
interaction between firing costs and on-the-job search (as measured by its intensity k1)
in shaping the job destruction rule. The slope of (5) in a ðD; k1Þ space turns out to be
of ambiguous sign for positive firing costs. Without such costs, a ceteris paribus increase
in k1 unambiguously reduces the firm’s valuation of a job (at any productivity level) as
it raises both the worker’s quit rate and the probability of having to transfer some of
the match surplus to the worker in response to an outside job offer, leading the firm
to discount the positive option value of the job (shown in the integral term in (5))
more heavily. Without firing costs, a higher k1 thus clearly leads to an increase in the
job destruction threshold D. When firing costs are in place though, the event of the
worker quitting is beneficial to the firm in some cases. As we saw in subsection 1.2, any
firm incurring losses is indeed happy to let its worker go at a cost lower than T: the
opportunity arises when the worker receives an outside offer which s/he will accept,
possibly subject to receiving a severance package which is always less than the statutory
firing cost T. In short, employed job search provides a channel through which
employers can escape job security provisions. And of course, the higher the firing
cost, the greater scope there is for this type of situation to arise. As a result, for any
positive value of T, the job destruction schedule becomes downward sloping for high
values of k1.
The flip side of this argument is that employed job search impacts the sensitivity of
the job destruction threshold to changes in job security provisions. When faced with an
increase in T, firms weigh the cost of hoarding labour to a further extent (by lowering
D) against the associated benefit of not having to pay the higher firing cost. More
specifically, the direct cost of lowering D is to keep currently less productive jobs
occupied, thus incurring greater current losses. This is mitigated by a positive effect of
lowering D, which is to increase the job’s option value (which accounts for the
possibility of the job becoming profitable again in the future). However, on-the-job
search weakens this positive option value effect as it makes it more likely that the
worker will leave the firm before the job becomes productive again. Therefore the total
cost of cutting the job destruction threshold is ceteris paribus higher when employees
search more intensely. The immediate benefit of further labour hoarding, on the other
hand, is to trade the certainty of having to pay the firing cost now for the possibility of
paying it at some future date. But again this latter possibility is less likely to materialise
in the presence of on-the-job search, as it may cause the worker to leave the job at no
(or little) cost for the firm. Hence the total benefit of labour hoarding also increases
with employed job search intensity.
Because both the cost and benefit of reducing the job destruction threshold in the
face of an increase in T are higher when employees search more intensely, the net
impact of on-the-job search on the responsiveness of D to firing costs is generally
ambiguous. For large enough values of T though, labour hoarding becomes the more
attractive option when workers are searching on the job and the job destruction
threshold will be lower than in the absence of employed job search.
To summarise, in the absence of firing costs, the job destruction threshold will be
higher with on-the-job search than without whereas the opposite is true under large
enough firing costs. As a consequence, when contrasting an equilibrium with zero
firing costs with one with large firing costs, we predict a greater decrease in the job
destruction rate when employed job search is allowed.
3. The Full Model: Endogenous Contact Rates
The analysis so far has kept the firm–worker contact rates ðk0; k1Þ exogenous. While it
allowed us to preserve some analytical tractability (most of which we shall lose in the
rest of this article) and therefore to analyse the impact of policy on the job destruction
margin with some degree of generality, it is clearly unsatisfactory from an equilibrium
viewpoint as it amounts to shutting down labour demand. We thus now extend the
model to allow for endogenous contact rates. In so doing we shall use a matching
function, thus continuing to stick to the DMP tradition.
3.1. The Matching Process
Search is random and firms advertise new jobs in the knowledge that the pool of
job seekers comprises both unemployed and employed workers. As seen above, all
employed workers are assumed to engage in on-the-job search. Their search intensity,
relative to that of unemployed workers, is denoted s1 ¼ k1=k0. We assume the matching
technology to exhibit constant returns to scale, which leads to the following expressions
for the two job offer rates: k0 ¼ vha and k1 ¼ s1k0, where h ¼ v=½u þ s1ð1  uÞ
denotes labour market tightness. u, 1  u and v denote the stocks of unemployment,
employment and vacancies, respectively, v captures matching efficiency and a denotes
the matching elasticity with respect to vacant jobs.
The rate at which a firm contacts an unemployed (employed) worker is q0ðhÞ [q1ðhÞ],








u þ s1ð1 uÞ :
Finally, the steady-state unemployment rate follows from a conventional flow-balance
condition as u ¼ dF ðDÞ=½dF ðDÞ þ k0.
3.2. Job Creation
We assume free entry of vacancies in the search market so that the value of a vacant job
is zero. Under our maintained assumption that Eð1;wminÞ [ U , unemployed workers
accept all job offers made to them as they yield a value that is greater than the value of
being unemployed.
As seen in subsection 1.3, the optimal offer made to attract an employed worker is
to give the worker a value of V(z), where z is the productivity of the worker’s old
match. The expected profit of a vacancy will thus depend on the distribution of z in
filled jobs. We will denote L() the steady-state distribution of productivity in
currently filled jobs and derive it as follows by writing the flow balance for the stock
of matches with productivity below z, L(z). The flow into L(z) comes from filled
matches with productivity higher than z having received a shock lower than z and not
been destroyed. The flow rate out of L(z) is due to productivity shocks leading to
either job destruction or a surviving match with a productivity higher than z and to
outside offers.
LðzÞd½F ðzÞ  F ðDÞ ¼ LðzÞ½d F ðzÞ þ dF ðDÞ þ k1; ð7Þ
which implies:10
LðzÞ ¼ d
dþ k1 ½F ðzÞ  F ðDÞ: ð8Þ
Employed workers accept offers yielding a value (including the severance package if
any) greater than the maximum value of employment that their current employer is
10 Note the existence of a mass at the productivity of new matches (z ¼ 1) equal to ½k1 þ dF ðDÞ=ðd þ k1Þ. 
prepared to offer them. Workers currently employed in a match with a productivity
less than zm will be successfully attracted with a wage offer of wmin, leaving the
advertising firm with a value of the new match of J ð1;wminÞ. Workers currently
employed in a match with a productivity z in the range ½zm ; 1 will require a
wage offer that yields them a value of V(z) to quit their existing employer (with
or without a severance package from that employer, as is detailed above in
subsection 1.3). This leaves the advertising firm with a value of the new match of V
(1)  V(z). Combining all these facts, we can write the asset price equation for
vacant jobs as:
0 ¼ k þ q0ðhÞJ ð1;wminÞ þ q1ðhÞ J ð1;wminÞLðzmÞ þ
Z 1
zm
½V ð1Þ  V ðxÞdLðxÞ
 
; ð9Þ
where k denotes advertising costs. Using (8) and integration by parts, we obtain the
following job creation condition:
0 ¼ k þ 1





½F ðxÞ  F ðDÞdx
 
: ð10Þ
Condition (10) equates the marginal flow cost k of posting a vacancy to the marginal
expected flow benefit of doing so. Looking at the expected benefit terms, the first of
those reflects the expected benefit from contacting an unemployed worker whereas
the second one relates to contacts with already employed workers. The total expected
benefit from posting a vacancy decreases with labour market tightness h for the
following two reasons. First, the matching rates of vacancies are decreasing functions of
h. Second, the expected value of a new hire is negatively related to h as a higher h
causes a higher k1, thus an increase in the mass of filled jobs at the top productivity
z ¼ 1. Besides, the right-hand side of (10) decreases with D as a higher job destruction
threshold raises the mean productivity in filled jobs in which productivity is greater
than zm . The job creation condition (10) thus defines a negatively-sloped relationship
between h and D.11
The level of firing costs T does not affect the relationship between h and ðzm ;DÞ
embodied in (10), so increases in T will only affect equilibrium labour market tightness
through their impact on the thresholds zm and D. Finally, let us note that, without
employed job search, all contacts relating to vacant jobs occur with unemployed
workers and that, on average, these leave a larger share of the new match value V(1) to
the firm. As the search intensity of the employed, s1, increases, the expected benefit of
posting a vacancy decreases, so a greater s1 unambiguously discourages job creation, all
other things equal.
3.3. Equilibrium: Determination and Comparative Statics
We want to analyse the impact of firing costs T on the equilibrium allocation of our
economy. We begin with some formal definitions, leading to the definition of an
equilibrium allocation:
11 This claim is also straightforward to prove formally by differentiation of (10). 
DEFINITION 1. Equilibrium Allocation.
















ui þ s1ð1 uiÞ ;
(ii) Flow-balance:
ui ¼ dF ðD
iÞ
dF ðDiÞ þ ki0
;
(iii) Proﬁt Maximisation (inefﬁcient regime): ðhi ;Di ; zimÞ jointly solve the job
creation condition (10), the job destruction condition (5) and the auxiliary
equation (C.4).
(2) An Efficient-regime Allocation is a tuple ðhe ; ke0; ke1; qe0; qe1;De ; zem ;ueÞ satisfying the
Matching function and Flow-balance properties, plus the following:
(i) Profit Maximisation (efficient regime): ðhe ;De ; zemÞ jointly solve the job creation
condition (10) and (C.6, C.8, C.10) – or, equivalently, the job destruction
condition (6).
(3) An Equilibrium Allocation is a tuple ½h; k0; k1; q0; q1;D; zm ;u;LðÞ with the following
properties:
(i) ðh; k0; k1; q0; q1;D; zm ;uÞ ¼ ðhi ; ki0; ki1; qi0; qi1;Di ; zim ;uiÞ if Di  De and
ðh; k0; k1; q0; q1;D; zm ;uÞ ¼ ðhe ; ke0; ke1; qe0; qe1;De ; zem ;ueÞ if Di\De, with the
convention Di ¼ 1 (De ¼ 1) if an inefficient- (efficient-) regime
allocation fails to exist;
(ii) The distribution of match productivity among workers, L(), is given by (8).
The formal definition of an equilibrium allocation is complicated by the possibility of
two different regimes. In practice, however, part (3) of the above definition offers a
simple algorithm to determine which regime the economy is in: first, look for both an
efficient-separation and an inefficient-separation equilibrium and pick whichever one
has the higher job destruction threshold. Details of the derivation of equilibrium are
reported in Appendix C.12
From the above definition, we see that existence and uniqueness properties of the
equilibrium allocation clearly hinge on the existence and uniqueness properties of the
solution to the system of equations in (h, D) formed by the job creation and job
destruction conditions, after replacing the contact rates (the ks and qs) and the
productivity threshold zm as functions of h and D. Given the equilibrium values of h and
12 Definition 1 applies to equilibrium allocations, which is what we are interested in. Equilibrium payoffs
are a tuple of values [V(z), U, E (z, w), J (z, w)] solving the Bellman equations (1)–(4) and a joint distribution
of (z,w) that is consistent with steady-state, optimal turnover behaviour and the bargaining rules assumed in
the article. We are leaving the analysis of the distributions of wages and firm profits in this model for future
research.
D, the contact rates, the unemployment rate and the productivity threshold zm are
uniquely pinned down by the matching function, the flow-balance condition
u ¼ dF ðDÞ=½dF ðDÞ þ k0, and the condition V ðzmÞ ¼ Eð1;wminÞ, respectively. Because
the job creation and job destruction conditions form a highly non-linear and implicit
system, any further formal analysis of existence or uniqueness would be very tedious,
and somewhat tangential to our main objective. Existence is not really an issue in
applications, where one looks for an equilibrium solution given a set of parameter
values. The possibility of multiple equilibria is potentially more of a concern.13 Yet here
again, in applications, we simulate the full non-linear model and we are able to search
for equilibrium solutions over the whole domain of admissible values for h and D (i.e.
h 2 Rþand D 2 ½0; 1Þ: Multiple equilibria never occurred in any of the calibration
exercises that we tried.
We now examine the comparative statics properties of these solutions. Our two
policy tools of interest impact job creation in a conventional way: raising either the
minimum wage wmin or the firing cost T decreases the expected value of the newly
created job, decreasing D for given values of h, thus shifting the job creation schedule
downwards.
As we saw in subsection 2.3, at given labour market tightness h, the job destruction
threshold D decreases with an increase in firing costs T and increases with an increase
in the minimum wage wmin in the inefficient separation regime. These facts combined
with the downward shift of the job creation schedule allow us to predict that an
increase in T will result in a decrease in the job destruction threshold D and an
ambiguously-signed change in h, while an increase in the minimum wage will result in a
drop in labour market tightness h and an ambiguous net change in job destruction. It
is difficult to say more analytically about the comparative static properties of our
model’s equilibrium. The combined effect of policy on job creation and job
destruction on equilibrium unemployment is ambiguously signed.14 We thus now
turn to simulations.
4. Calibration and Comparative Statics
The simulation exercises that we now describe are intended to illustrate the role of on-
the-job search in the response of the labour market to changes in firing costs and the
minimum wage. As will be seen shortly, this response is markedly different with and
without employed job search.
13 As we saw in subsection 2.3, for small values of firing costs T the job destruction rule defines an
increasing schedule in the (D, h) space under the inefficient separation regime. This combined with the
negative slope of the job creation schedule established in the previous subsection ensures the uniqueness of
equilibrium (given existence) when T is small. For larger values of T however, the slope of the inefficient job
destruction schedule may become negative, so, if the inefficient regime prevails, this opens the possibility of
multiple equilibria arising. Things get even less transparent under the efficient separation regime, where
equilibrium is defined by a non-recursive system of three non-linear equations ((C.4), (10) and (5)).
14 Another important property that no longer holds in general under endogenous contact rates is the
pattern of regime prevalence described in Propositions 2 and 3. Because k0 and k1 both respond to policy
changes in equilibrium, the monotonicity properties of the match surplus that were used in the proofs of
these Propositions are lost. While any pattern can potentially emerge with endogenous contact rates, the
labour market will still behave according to Propositions 2 and 3 in our simulations below.
4.1. Baseline Simulation
Table 2 reports the values that we assign to the model’s parameters and the functional
form that we adopt for the sampling distribution of productivity shocks. Flow
parameters are expressed in monthly values. We set the annual discount rate to 5%,
which translates into the monthly value shown in Table 2. We assume that productivity
shocks occur every three years on average. While this may seem infrequent, we should
recall that these shocks capture profound and long-lasting changes to match
productivity that have the potential of causing a match breakup. The sampling
distribution of match-specific productivity shocks F() is assumed to be uniform over
the [0,1] interval. The matching elasticity with respect to vacancies, a is set at 0.2, which
lies in the range of estimated values reported by Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001). The
parameter relating to advertising costs k is set at 0.2 as in Shimer (2005) and the
matching efficiency v is simply calibrated so as to ensure a monthly finding rate
consistent with typical UK facts. In order to highlight the contrast between labour
market responses to changes in institutions with and without employed job search, we
carry out the simulations with two benchmark values of the relative matching
efficiency: s1 ¼ 0 and s1 ¼ 0:15. The former value yields a labour market without
employed job search while the latter value delivers a labour market where about a third
of job accessions relate to direct job-to-job moves.
As for our institutions of interest, we set the minimum wage at wmin ¼ 0:65 and we
allow the firing cost to vary between 0 and 12 months of the maximum productivity.
The calibrated value for the minimum wage may seem high and is set at this level to
emphasise clearly the role of on-the-job search in a segment of the labour market
where the minimum wage is binding.15
Finally, we set the unemployment income to b ¼ 0.3. Such a low value can be
justified if one interprets b as unemployment income net of specific costs incurred by
the unemployed (search costs, stigma ...). It is needed to ensure positive match
surpluses over a reasonable range of productivity values. This follows from the fact that
the job offer arrival rate is much lower for employed (k1) than for unemployed job
Table 2
Baseline Model Calibration
q d k a v b wmin
0.0043 1/36 0.2 0.2 0.12 0.3 0.65
F() uniform over (0,1)
15 In other simulations with lower values of wmin (specifically, wmin ¼ 0:45, simulations available upon
request), we find that the threshold firing cost above which the efficient regime prevails tends to zero (under
a month of maximum productivity) when on-the-job search is allowed. By contrast, this threshold stays at just
under four months in the environment without employed job search. As a consequence, for a lower value of
the minimum wage, raising firing costs beyond one month of maximum productivity ceases to have an impact
on unemployment flows and rate in the presence of on-the-job search. When job-to-job turnover is ignored,
though, firing costs retain a small impact at this level of minimum wage, whereby the unemployment rate is
reduced by 0.7 percentage point when firing costs are raised from zero to four months of maximum
productivity.
seekers (k0), in line with the findings of Jolivet et al. (2006). As a result, the option
value of unemployed search is much higher than that of employed search. For the
surplus to be positive in a match with relatively low productivity, the flow income in
unemployment needs to be much smaller than the flow income for the worker in such
a match.
Figure 1 shows the response of various basic labour market indicators to a variation
in the statutory dismissal cost T (x-axis, expressed in months of match output at
maximum productivity z ¼ 1), under both values of the relative matching efficiency for
the employed detailed above. We predict monthly job destruction rates of around 1.5%
and a job finding rate for the unemployed of about 18%, which yields a predicted
unemployment rate of around 7.5%, all in line with typical UK figures.
4.2. The Impact of Firing Costs
4.2.1. Job creation and job destruction under both regimes
What is immediately striking in Figure 1 is the obvious regime switch occurring at a
value of T equal to 4–5 months of the maximum productivity. In spite of contact rates
being endogenous in the simulations, the market clearly behaves as described in
Propositions 2 and 3: for a given value of wmin, the inefficient separation regime
prevails at relatively low values of T, while the market stays in the efficient separation
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Fig. 1. Simulation Results for wmin ¼ 0:65 and Variable Firing Costs T (x-axis) 
regime for a redundancy pay beyond a certain size. Note that the threshold between
the two regimes is lower in the presence of employed job search, so that a market
where employed workers’ search intensity is greater will be more likely to be in the
efficient separation regime, for a given level of the institution mix of T and wmin.
Under the inefficient separation regime and in the absence of employed job
search, the qualitative predictions of our model regarding the impact of statutory
firing costs on job destruction and job creation rates are standard. Higher firing costs
slow down both of these, unambiguously reducing unemployment flows but having a
small and ambiguously-signed net effect on the unemployment rate. In fact, this
effect turns out to be slightly positive in this simulation. By contrast, with on-the-job
search, we observe a much sharper decline of the job destruction rate as severance
pay increases, as was predicted in Section 2. From a quantitative standpoint, the
impact of T on job destruction is magnified by the presence of on-the-job search, thus
suggesting that the firing-tax avoidance effect of employed job search is quantitatively
more important than the discount effect on the option value (see the discussion in
subsection 2.3). The picture relating to the unemployed job finding rate also shows a
sharp difference with the simulated results obtained without on-the-job search:
increases in severance pay have hardly any impact on the job finding rate when
employed job search is allowed. This difference in responsiveness of job creation to
variations in T comes from the steeper response of the job destruction threshold D to
changes in firing costs when employed job search is present. Indeed, a decrease in D
renders a contact made with an employed worker more attractive in expectation
terms as it shifts the distribution of idiosyncratic productivity in filled jobs to the left.
In other words, it increases the probability that an advertising employer will only have
to offer V ðzmÞ to attract an employed worker upon meeting one (and decreases the
probability of being left with a zero share of the match value, i.e. of making contact
with an employed worker in an existing match with maximum idiosyncratic
productivity z ¼ 1). As a consequence, the overall impact of increases in firing costs
on the unemployment rate is much more marked than with than without on-the-job
search as the substantial decrease displayed in the bottom-left panel of Figure 1
illustrates. Increasing the statutory severance pay from zero to five months’ maximum
productivity is predicted to cut the unemployment rate by slightly over 1.5 percentage
point.
This, however, only relates to an economy in the inefficient separation regime. As is
obvious from Figure 1, things change dramatically as the economy enters the efficient
separation regime, at which point firing costs cease to have any impact at all.
4.2.2. Job-to-job reallocation
The job-to-job switching rate increases as statutory firing costs are raised. The job
switching rate equals the job offer arrival rate k1 times the probability that the typical
outside offer be accepted by its recipient, Lð1Þ ¼ d F ðDÞ=ðd þ k1Þ – see (8). As
the arrival rate of offers is virtually unaffected by firing costs and D decreases markedly,
the overall impact is an increase in the job-to-job turnover rate. This combined with the
fact that the unemployment rate decreases with T implies that total job-to-job
reallocation increases while unemployment flows decrease, so that the share of worker
reallocation due to direct job-to-job moves increases markedly with increases in T, as
illustrated in the bottom-right panel of Figure 1. This is consistent with the prediction
that job security provisions ‘redistribute employment opportunities from unemployed
to employed workers’ (Kugler and Saint-Paul, 2004). It also matches empirical
evidence gathered by Boeri (1999), who reports shares of job-to-job reallocation within
total labour reallocation for a sample of OECD (mostly European) countries in the
range of 30%–50% and increasing with the tightness of employment legislation.
5. Conclusion
Adding on-the-job search and negotiation over severance packages alters the
quantitative predictions of the standard DMP model markedly without employed
job search regarding the impact of firing costs on employment flows and the
unemployment rate. In our simulations, increasing the firing costs from zero to five
months of the maximum productivity reduces the unemployment rate by one and a
half percentage points, whereas a typical calibration of the DMP model without on-
the-job search would predict an ambiguous and quantitatively negligible effect on the
unemployment rate. Furthermore, past a certain level of firing costs, further
increases in said costs become marginally ineffective, as in Fella (2007). This occurs
because, as firing costs are increased beyond a threshold, it becomes profitable for
firms to induce workers to quit into unemployment by offering suitable compensa-
tion. That threshold is an increasing function of the minimum wage, so that firing
costs are less likely to impact unemployment when the minimum wage is high. This
concurs with arguments made in Garibaldi and Violante (1998) or Cahuc and
Zylberberg (1999), whereby the degree of wage rigidity is a key determinant of the
effectiveness of firing restrictions policies.
The main distinguishing feature of our analysis is that we take into account the
possibility of on-the-job search and job-to-job quits. The role that job quitters play in
our framework becomes important in situations where the firm incurs losses (in the
presence of firing restrictions), poaching firms are constrained in the offers they can
make (in the presence of a wage floor) and the incumbent firm and worker pair are
able to negotiate over the amount of a severance package (under the mutual consent
rule). We argue that the extent of job-to-job reallocation is a key feature of the
economy’s response to a change in the policy choice in terms of combined firing cost
and minimum wage. Of course, it may be that firing costs also impact on employed
search intensity if, for example, only tenured employees are entitled to job protection.
This feedback channel is not explored in this article and is a possible avenue of
extension of this research.
Appendix A: Strategic Bargaining Games
In this Appendix, we give formal details of the strategic bargaining game that is played by parties
in a match after the occurrence of either a productivity shock or an outside job offer. While the
same game is played in both situations, payoffs and equilibrium play depend on whether
the game was triggered by a productivity shock or an outside offer. We begin by describing the
former case.
A.1. Renegotiation Following a Productivity Shock
Consider an ongoing match drawing a new productivity shock x, which, given the wage w
inherited from previous periods, yields values of E and J to the worker and the firm, respectively.
These values are known to both parties. The game represented in extensive form in Figure A1
ensues. Following the occurrence of a productivity shock, the worker has no outside offer in
hand, so his outside option is to quit into unemployment, which has value U. For the firm, the
outside option is worth T if the firm has to lay off the worker to exit the relationship, as the
value of holding a vacant job is zero. If the worker quits, the firm’s value is zero as it is not paying
the firing cost. In our initial description of the renegotiation game in Figure A1 we ignore the
minimum wage, which we will reintroduce at a later stage.
Each party has the opportunity to prompt a negotiation. A key aspect of the game is that, in
the event of a party prompting negotiation, the other party gets one single chance to respond. The
worker has the first move, and triggering negotiation for the worker means quitting the match
(node 1 in Figure A1). For the firm it can mean laying off the worker or offering them an agreed
separation with a side-payment s to be determined in equilibrium (node 2.2).
If the worker announces a quit, the firm’s response (node 2.1) is either to let him do so
(leading to node 3.2) or to try and retain him (leading to node 3.1), which will be achieved by
offering a wage increase yielding the worker a value of employment in the current match of
U + e, where e is an arbitrarily small, strictly positive number. At node 3.1, the worker simply
accepts or rejects the firm’s new offer.
If the worker does not threaten to quit the job, the firm can do one of three things (node 2.2):
do nothing (leading to status quo payoffs: node 3.3); offer a severance package s (leading to
node 3.4) or layoff the worker (leading to node 3.5). If the firm offers a severance package (node
3.4), the worker may either accept or reject the offer. In the latter case, status quo prevails and
the firm does not get another chance to layoff in this round of negotiation (the game ends at
node 4.4). Finally, when faced with the threat of a layoff (node 3.5), the worker may of course do
nothing and accept being laid off (leading to node 4.5), but he also gets a chance to respond by
either offering a severance deal (leading to node 4.6) which the firm subsequently accepts or
rejects, or by offering to take a wage cut and continue the relationship (leading to node 4.7)
which the firm subsequently accepts or rejects.
The game is solved in standard fashion by backward induction and we skip the details of the
solution (available on request). Equilibrium strategies as well as the equilibrium value of the
severance package s offered by the firm at node 2.2 depend on initial match values E and J and
their position relative to the parties’ outside option payoffs. When the firm offers an agreed
separation (implying the worker quitting with a severance package s and the firm not having to
pay the layoff tax T ), the worker may reject it if his value of staying in the match with the
status quo, E, is greater than the value of leaving with the severance package, U + s. Thus the
minimum package s that the firm has to offer for the worker to accept it depends on the
worker’s current value of employment E. If E  U, then a severance package of e is enough to
induce the worker to leave the match. If E > U, a severance pay of E  U + e is just enough for
the worker to strictly prefer the agreed separation to the status quo. Note, however, that the
firm will never offer a severance package in excess of T as this is the amount it would need to
pay for a layoff. So s is capped at T. The relationship between the required s and E is
summarised as:
s ¼
T if E[U þ T
E  U þ e if U\E U þ T
0þ e if E U :
(
Given those values of s, Table A1 summarises equilibrium play and payoffs for a continuing
































































































































































































































Equilibrium Play and Payoffs After a Productivity Shock
J < T T < J < 0 J > 0
V  U 2.2, 3.5, 4.7, 5.3 2.2, 3.3 2.2, 3.3
E > U Wage decrease Status quo Status quo
(V + T  e,  T + e) (E, J ) (E, J )
2.1, 3.1, 4.1
E < U – – Wage increase
(U + e,V  U  e)
V < U 2.2, 3.4, 4.3 if U < E  U + T
2.2, 3.5, 4.6, 5.1 if E > U + T 2.2, 3.4, 4.3
E > U Agreed separation Agreed separation –
(U + s,  s), s ¼ min(T,E  U + e) [E + e,  (E  U + e)]
2.2, 3.4, 4.3 2.2, 3.4, 4.3 2.1, 3.2
E < U Agreed separation Agreed separation Quit
(U + e,  e) (U + e,  e) (U,0)
A.1.1. Binding minimum wage
As mentioned above, the results in Table A1 were obtained under the assumption of no binding
minimum wage, so that a worker’s wage may be low enough to make unemployment preferable
to employment at that wage, for a given productivity value x. In that case, the worker either quits
or agrees to a separation with an infinitesimal severance pay if the match becomes unprofitable
(bottom row of Table A1) and the worker is able to claim a pay raise by credibly threatening to
quit into unemployment if the match is still profitable (second row of the top panel of Table A1).
Those cases may be ruled out in the presence of a minimum wage that prevents the worker’s
wage from dropping low enough to equate E to U.
Also in the presence of a minimum wage, the wage may not be allowed to drop enough to
reduce the firm’s losses to T + e (top row of Table A1, when firm’s losses exceed T and the
worker prefers to stay in employment, V > U). In the notation introduced in the main text, this
happens when the new productivity draw, x, falls short of RT ðwminÞ. In that case, the match is
dissolved (even though it has positive surplus, V > U), and an agreed separation occurs with a
side payment of s ¼ min{E  U + e,T}.
A.1.2. If T is a transfer
When T is a tax, the sum of payoffs upon an agreed separation is U whereas it is only U  T if a
layoff goes ahead. Hence it is always jointly profitable to agree on a severance deal rather than
resort to a layoff and layoffs never occur in equilibrium (Fella, 2007). On the other hand, if T is a
transfer, the sum of payoffs upon separation is always U, be it a layoff or a separation. Layoffs are
no longer jointly inefficient and occur in some cases. This is the only substantive change to
equilibrium brought about by assuming that T is a transfer from the firm to the worker rather
than a tax.
Suppose that T is now paid directly from the firm to the worker upon layoff. The only things
that change in Figure A1 are the payoffs in case of a layoff, i.e. at nodes 4.5, 5.2 and 5.4. If T is a
transfer, the worker receives U + T rather than U at all three of those nodes. Solution of the
game by backward induction, however, reveals that the payoffs reported in Table A1 still apply in
the case where the firing cost is a transfer. The only difference to the case where T is a tax is that,
at node 4.6, the worker now rejects the severance deal offered by the firm and gets laid off,
receiving a payoff of U + T instead of U + T  e. So when T is a transfer, a fraction of the
separations are now labelled as layoffs, as opposed to all separations being agreed on in the case
where T is a tax. Apart from that, equilibrium strategies and payoffs are the same in both cases.
A.2. Renegotiation Following an Outside Job Offer
Consider an ongoing match with productivity z and wage w (yielding values of E and J to the
worker and the firm, respectively) in which the worker receives an outside offer with value E 0.16
All of those values are known to both parties. The game represented in extensive form in Figure
A2 ensues. Apart from the fact that the worker’s outside option is now to accept the outside offer,
which has value E 0 [ U , the game is identical to the one that is played when renegotiating after
a productivity shock (Figure A1). Also in Figure A2, the branch of the game starting at node 2.2
with the firm laying off the worker was deliberately omitted, as it is never played in equilibrium.
Indeed, unless an adverse productivity shock occurs, it cannot be optimal for the firm to fire the
worker (otherwise the firm would have done so already).
Once again, the game in Figure A2 is solved by backward induction. Equilibrium payoffs and
the implied optimal value E 0 of the poacher’s offer are discussed in the main text (Table 1).
Formal details of the game’s solution are available on request.
Appendix B: Properties of the Value Functions
In this Appendix, we establish a set of properties of the value functions defined in (1)–(4) that
will be useful for the rest of the analysis.
B.1. Derivatives and Monotonicity
From Table 1, we know that VoðzÞ ¼ max½V ðzÞ;V ðzmÞ where, from (3):
V 0ðzÞ ¼
1
qþ d if z[ zm
1
qþ dþ k1 if zm  z.
8><
>: ðB:1Þ
The combination of Table 1 and the value of V 0ðÞ just derived allows us to express the
partial derivatives ð@ Eo=@z; @ Jo=@zÞ as reported in Table B1. Expressions for the partial derivatives
1:Worker
2.1: Firm 2.2: Firm
3.2 3.33.1: Worker 3.4: Worker
4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4
(E´ + s, − s)
(E´, 0) (E, J)

























Fig. A2. Renegotiation Game Played after Outside Job Offer
16 Note that, when the worker receives an outside offer, he is in a continuing match, so E > U and J > T. 
(@E/@z;@J/@z) then follow from the Bellman equations (1)–(4). The various cases are covered in
Table B2. An important property derived from Table B2 is that the workers’ valuation of a job,
E(), is independent of match productivity z whenever the latter is less than zm .
B.2. Ranking of Various Productivity Thresholds
The following ranking of some important productivity thresholds will be used in subsequent
developments.
LEMMA 1. RT ðwminÞ\R0ðwminÞ\ zm  1 and RS\R0ðwminÞ.
Proof. In the first series of inequalities, the last inequality is almost by definition as
V ð1Þ [ Eð1;wminÞ ¼ V ðzmÞ (the inequality there holds true because otherwise there would be
no trade on the labour market). Then, because E() is increasing in z over ½zm ; 1 (see Table B2),
we have that Eðzm ;wminÞ\Eð1;wminÞ ¼ V ðzmÞ. Hence J ðzm ;wminÞ ¼ V ðzmÞ  Eðzm ;wminÞ [ 0,
which proves that a firm paying the minimum wage in a match with productivity zm makes a
profit, hence R0ðwminÞ\ zm (the second inequality). The first inequality RT ðwminÞ\R0ðwminÞ is a
direct consequence of @J/@z being positive throughout.
Now turning to the second claim RS\R0ðwminÞ, we have that J ðRS ;wminÞ ¼
V ðRSÞ  EðRS ;wminÞ ¼ U  EðRS ;wminÞ (by the definition of RS). This last term is negative
by assumption (as workers are never willing to quit into unemployment).
Appendix C: Derivation of the Job Destruction Thresholds
C.1. The Inefficient Separation Regime: D ¼ RT ðwminÞ
By definition of the inefficient separation regime, the job destruction condition is given by
 Table B1
f@Eo=@z; @Jo =@zg
z  R0ðwÞ z [ R0ðwÞ
1  z [ zm ½V 0ðzÞ; 0 (@E/@z;@J/@z)
zm  z (0; 0) (0; 0) if V ðzmÞ  Eðz;wÞ
(@E/@z;  @E/@z) if V ðzmÞ\Eðz;wÞ
Table B2
{@E/@z;@J/@z}
z  R0ðwÞ z [ R0ðwÞ
1  z [ zm @E=@z 0 pk1





q þ d þ k1
zm  z @E=@z 0 0
@J =@z
p
q þ d þ k1
p
q þ d þ k1
D ¼ RT ðwminÞ , J ðD; wminÞ ¼   T . Combining this condition with the Bellman equation (1) 
defining the firm’s valuation of a job J() in (1), we obtain:
ðqþ dþ k1ÞT ¼ D  wmin þ dJsðwminÞ þ k1 JoðD;wminÞ: ðC:1Þ
From Table 1, the firm’s value of the continuing match after an outside offer, JoðD;wminÞ is zero
as EðD;wminÞ\V ðzmÞ. The firm’s expected value of the continuing match after a shock to match
quality becomes:
JsðwminÞ ¼ TF ðDÞ þ
Z 1
D




where the second equality is obtained with integration by parts and the partial derivative values in
Table B2 (note that this integration by parts also uses the property zm  R0ðwminÞ, from Lemma





F ðxÞdx ¼ wmin  T ðqþ k1Þ; ðC:3Þ
where, in standard fashion, a bar over a CDF denotes the corresponding survivor function.
The definition of zm , V ðzmÞ ¼ Eð1;wminÞ, implies that V ð1Þ  V ðzmÞ ¼ J ð1;wminÞ. The
derivative V 0ðzÞ derived in (B.1) imply in turn that V ð1Þ  V ðzmÞ ¼ ð1  zmÞ=ðq þ dÞ, while the
partial derivatives @J/@z given in Table B2 further imply that J ð1;wminÞ ¼ J ½RT ðwminÞ;wmin þ
½1  RT ðwminÞ=ðq þ d þ k1Þ ¼ T þ ½1  RT ðwminÞ=ðq þ d þ k1Þ. Combining both
expressions, we obtain a solution for zm :
zm ¼ k1 þ ðqþ dÞRT ðwminÞqþ dþ k1 þ ðqþ dÞT : ðC:4Þ
C.2. The Efficient Separation Regime: D ¼ RS
The formal definition of D applying in this case is slightly more involved and will require solving
the three equations derived below for the unknowns RS , zm , V ðzmÞ.
First, from (4), the value of unemployment is written as:
U ¼ 1
qþ k0 ½b þ k0V ðzmÞ: ðC:5Þ
Derivatives given in Table B2 further imply that V ðzmÞ ¼ V ðRSÞ þ ðzm  RSÞ=ðq þ d þ k1Þ.
Combining this with the job destruction condition in the efficient regime V ðRSÞ ¼ U , we obtain
a first expression for V ðzmÞ:
qV ðzmÞ ¼ b þ qþ k0qþ dþ k1 ðzm  RSÞ: ðC:6Þ
Second, the value of employment when first hired from unemployment (recall that new
matches start with a productivity of 1) is obtained from Bellman equation (2) applied to this
specific case:
ðqþ dþ k1ÞEð1;wminÞ ¼ wmin þ dF ðRSÞEðRS ;wminÞ þ d
Z 1
RS
Eðx;wminÞdF ðxÞ þ k1V ð1Þ; ðC:7Þ
which, after some algebra,17 gives us our second expression for V ðzmÞ:






17 First substitute Eð1; wminÞ ¼  V ðzm Þ, then use integration by parts in the integral taking the value of 
@Eðx; wminÞ=@x from Table B2.
Finally, using Bellman equation (3) to write the value of the surplus at zm :
ðqþ dÞV ðzmÞ ¼ zm þ dF ðRSÞU þ d
Z 1
RS
V ðxÞdF ðxÞ; ðC:9Þ
we obtain our third equation:18
qðqþ dþ k0Þ












The three equations (C.6), (C.8) and (C.10) pin down the three unknowns V ðzmÞ, RS and zm . It is
clear from these equations that RS does not depend on T as firing costs are absent altogether
from the system of equations. This contrasts with the inefficient separation regime seen above
where T clearly impacts on RT ðwminÞ as (C.3) above shows.
Appendix D: Proofs of Propositions 2 and 3
As discussed in Section 2, the inefficient separation regime prevails whenever V(D) > U where D,
the job destruction threshold, equals RT ðwminÞ and is defined in (C.3). We first differentiate





¼ ðqþ k1Þðqþ dþ k1Þ
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¼ ðqþ dÞdF ðDÞ












Now evaluating V(z) at z ¼ D ¼ RT ðwminÞ using (3) and (4) and rearranging using (5) and (B.1)
leads to:
½qþ dF ðDÞ þ k1V ðDÞ ¼ wmin  b  ðqþ k1ÞT  k0  k1qþ dþ k1
k1ð1 DÞ
qþ dþ k1 þ ðqþ dÞT
 




The right-hand side in (D.7) is a function of the policy tools T, wmin and b, both directly and
through the threshold values D and zm , which we denote by N ðT ;wmin; bÞ. Using the partial
derivatives derived above in (D.1)–(D.6), tedious but straightforward algebra allows us to
18 Again, this involves integration by parts in the integral taking the value of V 0ðxÞ from (B.1). 
establish that @N/@T < 0, @N =@wmin [ 0 and @N/@b < 0 (we do not report the derivations here 
but keep them available on request). It is likewise fairly straightforward to show that
limT!þ1N ðÞ ¼ limb!þ1N ðÞ ¼ 1 and that limwmin!þ1N ðÞ ¼ þ1. This proves Proposi-
tions 2 and 3.
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